The Future of Yemen in Light of Growing Saudi-Emirati Rivalry
This is Farea’s part during the panel. You can watch the full panel on YouTube here.
Streamed live on Jan 20, 2026
Organized by Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center
Yemen is entering a new phase of fragmentation, one that transcends the longstanding divide between Sanaa-based Ansar Allah (the Houthis) and the internationally recognized and Saudi-backed government in Aden. Indeed, tensions within the anti-Ansar Allah camp itself have intensified. The growing discord between the Yemeni government and the Emirati-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) highlights a widening gap between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, once key partners in the coalition fighting Ansar Allah. The coming period will be marked by high risks, as Saudi-backed forces in Yemen have moved against the STC, whose leader has fled for the United Arab Emirates. It is not yet clear what this portends for the STC’s separatist agenda, but without serious and genuine efforts to address southern Yemenis’ grievances, it is unlikely that the story will end here. What is almost certain is that the long-simmering Saudi-Emirati rivalry, which has now become overt, will have repercussions on both Yemen and the region. For one thing, the rivalry in question is unfolding alongside the still unresolved conflict between Ansar Allah and Yemen’s government. And for another, Ansar Allah and Israel remain poised for escalation. Meanwhile, Yemen continues to suffer heavy humanitarian costs as a result of years of war.
To explore these issues, the Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center hosted a virtual panel and brought together Yemeni experts to reflect on what the latest developments mean for Yemen’s political future.
The panel consisted of Farea al-Muslimi, research fellow at Chatham House’s Middle East and North Africa Programme; Yasmeen Al-Iryani, executive director for knowledge production at the Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies; Elham Manea, adjunct professor at the Institute of Political Science at the University of Zurich; and Bara’a Shaiban, associate fellow with the International Security research group at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI).
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Points made by Farea during the panel:
Overall, what we are witnessing in Yemen is a story of collective failure and missed opportunities; both domestically and regionally.
It is a failure of the GCC to formulate a unified policy toward Yemen or to position itself globally as a coordinated and responsible regional actor.
It is also a failure of Yemeni actors—most notably the STC - whose practice of politics and public policy in almost psychopathic mindset got us here.
And it is a persistent missed opportunity for the internationally recognized government since 2015, which failed to meaningfully capitalize on Gulf interest in Yemen.
The impact of the recent situation will be felt on multiple levels:
Domestically: Yes, one faction within the anti-Houthi camp may appear more victorious - but this comes at the cost of its own agency. The government is not powerful in Yemen today because they are powerful. But rather because Saudi Arabia decided they are. Even narratively, Yemenis are increasingly stripped of ownership over what is happening in their own country.
Internationally: The P5’s fragile consensus on Yemen will erode. Countries will increasingly be forced to choose between Saudi Arabia and the UAE. As experiences in Libya and Syria tells us, when the P5 projects their own divisions onto a country in turmoil, the outcome is not good.
Economically and Reconstruction: By the time the UAE was expected to start shaking its pockets and contribute meaningfully to rebuilding Yemen - after years of bombing it- it was effectively allowed to exit without cost or accountability.
Regionally: This rift will reverberate beyond Yemen, with consequences for the Horn of Africa, Red Sea security, Saudi-UAE coordination in Syria, Sudan conflict, and even the two countries' positions on the Palestinian issue.
For Iran: Iran continues to value the Saudi-Iranian understandings reached in Beijing in 2023. This does not mean Tehran will abandon the Houthi card- but it is for now happy watching Saudi Arabia and the UAE digging their own grave in Yemen without needing Houthi assistance.
And remember:
We shouldn’t expect the US to do much. The perception of America globally post 6th of January, post October 7th, and post the Ukraine War has totally changed. You no longer go to your American friend for help or for advice; every time you see an American official, you just want to give them a hug.
On Socotra: it belongs to Yemen - and to no one else. From the Balfour Declaration to more recent fantasies, external illusions about taking it or giving it to someone have always been wrong.
The best day for Yemen - and the day we should continue to work for - is the day Yemenis ( and only Yemenis), one way or another, reclaim decision-making over their own future.
Moving ahead, what truly matters is the process, not the outcome in isolation. Not an independent South Yemen, not federalism per se- but a political process that unfolds at the right time, under the right conditions, and with a real Yemeni ownership.
